Gambling Control Division Investigations Supervisor Tom Oberweiser, Billings, told owners of gaming businesses that increased security measures ought to be implemented in the face of increasingly sophisticated attempts at defrauding licensees.
He spoke to the Gaming Industry Association Board of Directors when they met at the Best Bet Casino in Helena Jan. 31.
Oberweiser said about a dozen instances of fake tickets have cropped up recently, most concentrated in the Billings area. He told of cracking a small ring of counterfeiters last December who were using the latest in computers, scanners, graphics programs and printers to create highly authentic, though fraudulent, video gaming machine win tickets.
These were Billings honors students just starting college careers who cashed two counterfeits for $500 each before an alert casino employee smelled out the scheme, then alerted authorities. Good video surveillance led to the arrest of four males.
They received probation, paid fines and agreed to provide investigators a detailed video depicting exactly how the crime was done. Oberweiser played the video for his audience.
In essence, the scammers would enter a casino, play a machine awhile, then print out a ticket for a five-dollar win. They would leave without cashing the ticket, he related.
Back at their computer work stations, the cons would use high quality scanners to create a digital image of the ticket, then would use the highly sophisticated and accurate graphics programs such as Photoshop that are now commonly available to alter the digital image of the ticket.
They would simply select, copy and remove the period from a "$5.00" pay-out figure, then select, copy and move to the left the "00" digits, reinsert the period, and then digitally "paste" two more zeros after it to create a new "$500.00" figure in place of the original "$5.00" amount. For a fraud artist with elementary knowledge of graphics programs, the operation is a simple one.
These crooks would similarly alter the date and time line to match the exact time they planned to attempt the fraud.
But one bit of ticket data that could have tripped them up, had the location personnel been paying closer attention, was their failure to alter the sequential "Cash Ticket No."
When the cons actually passed their counterfeit, the sequence number on their fraudulent ticket was in the mid-800s as it was on the original, whereas by the time they actually got around to presenting it--several days after the original had been printed--that machine's sequence numbers were up past 1,000. An alert cashier could have been keeping a running tally of win ticket sequence numbers for each machine, and immediately spotted the anomaly.
This, in fact, was one of the simple measures Oberweiser advocated to stop these fraud artists in their tracks.
He noted, however, that cons working quickly, could text-message the correct--or a close approximation of--the sequence number to cohorts outside, then immediately process a fake and have it brought to the premises, so additional measures also ought to be implemented.
First, though, he said it would be helpful to understand other
tactics used by the cons.
They tend to work in teams and prefer a target location where it is unlikely the owner is present, Oberweiser said, since they believe an owner is more likely to exercise more diligence in detecting and preventing a fraud.
They also will look for a location with a dark interior believing that low light will aid them in passing off a counterfeit that might contain minute imperfections.
A casino layout that affords too much player privacy and too little staff scrutiny is a more attractive target, too, Oberweiser said.
He said cons will also seek out establishments that are understaffed or very busy with young staff since attendants and cashiers may then pay less attention to the appearance and quality of the ticket.
He suggested operators keep a running tally of ticket sequence numbers for each machine, then check submitted win tickets against the sequence to make sure they fall numerically into place.
He urged operators to use inks sensitive to ultra-violet light, then check them under a "black light" lamp to assure validity.
In addition, security papers with watermarks are highly recommended as a means of thwarting counterfeits. Bar coding and scanning tickets could also serve as a prophylactic measure, he said.
The most fail-safe method to prevent fraud, Oberweiser said, is to, upon a player presenting a win ticket for payment, ask them to wait a moment while an attendant authenticates the ticket by checking the audit rolls in the machine to ascertain it just paid out.
Inevitably, if this step is taken, fraud perpetrators will scoot immediately, he said.
If an operator, cashier or attendant is suspicious of players or tickets, or has discovered a crime, Oberweiser urged them to immediately jot down notes describing the suspects, witnesses on the premises, who was on shift and so on. Also, do not wipe down the machine as it may bear the fingerprints of suspects, he added.
He urged operators to evaluate video surveillance security systems for camera angles, reproduction quality of recordings and cleanliness of lenses. He also suggested old analog (tape) systems be upgraded with digital recorders and cameras for their enhanced playback quality and ease of integration with other systems.
By "dumping" or reconciling machines every day, operators are also more likely to quickly discover a fraud if it has been missed otherwise, and speed of detection will enhance the chances of perpetrator capture, Oberweiser concluded.
He received an enthusiastic round of applause from an appreciative GIA board.
Source: The Montana Tavern Times, March, 2008, published monthly by Continental Communications, 125 W. Granite St., Suite 102, Butte, MT 59701.